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Abstract: The game model of sewage charges, based on incremental mode, was 
developed. Four modes of high/low sewage charge standards were utilized to analyze the 
relationship between control strategy on sewage discharge and the development of 
environmental protection industry. Results showed that the selection of control strategy was 
heavily dependent on the level of sewage charges. An empirical study was carried out to 
investigate the environmental protection industry in 31 regions in China in 2010. It was 
revealed that the sewage charge standards, formulated by the local governments and the 
development of environmental protection industry, varied significantly in different regions. 
The optimal level of environmental quality and social welfare, as a whole, was not 
achieved in China. It is proposed that different regions should adopt different sewage 
charges standards based on their economic development level and the current 
environmental quality. Similarly, the scientific and technological innovation of 
environmental protection industry should be further strengthened. 
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1. Introduction 
China has achieved a rapid economic growth during the last few decades. However, the 
environmental issues associated with urbanization and industrialization have become even more 
crucial due to the coal-dominated energy mix and low energy efficiency in China [1–4]. It presents a 
significant challenge for the Chinese government to maintain sustained economic growth without the cost 
of the environment, which is reflected in Five-Year Strategic Plans released by the Chinese 
Government [5]. As a result, the environmental protection industry has developed rapidly. The official 
definition of the environmental protection industry is the production and business activities for the 
purpose of preventing environmental pollution and improving environmental quality. It consists of 
three aspects: the production of environmental protection equipment or products, the comprehensive 
utilization of resources, and environmental services [6]. Therefore, it is imperative to explore the 
dynamics of environmental protection policies, the environmental protection industry, and polluting 
enterprises to achieve an optimal balance. Sewage charge policy is one of the most effective 
environmental policies in China. The sewage charge cost will affect the attitude of the polluting 
enterprises in regards to environmental treatment, thereby affecting the production strategy for 
environmental protection industries. Therefore, sewage charges show a certain level of impact on the 
development of the environmental protection industry by affecting the behavior of polluting 
enterprises. The interaction among environmental policies, the environmental protection industry, and 
polluting enterprises has attracted substantial attention, both in China and overseas [7–9]. It is well 
recognized that sewage charge is one of most widely adopted environmental policies to deal with 
environmental issues [10–14]. Pollutant emission from companies has been controlled effectively by 
the sewage charges policy, especially in Europe and America [12,15,16]. Bressers argued that high 
sewage charges system played an important role in fostering pollutant-reduction behavior [17]. 
Bergman analyzed the sewage charges design theory and methods in Canada, and concluded that 
sewage charges were important for pollution control [18]. 
The environmental protection industry has its own development pattern, which is heavily guided by 
the government’s policies [19]. Therefore, the influence of government on the environmental 
protection industry has become an important field of study [20]. As an effective method for policy 
analysis, game theory has been widely employed in the fields of economic and environmental  
sciences [21–24]. Scott introduced game theory into the system for vicissitude analysis for the first 
time. Thereafter, the evolutionary game of economy came into being [25,26]. Jones used a game 
theoretic framework to model regulatory decision-making and firm response to pollution prevention 
policies [27]. The system was a balance of potential social game [28]. John et al. found that combined 
payoffs are larger with decentralized control if payoffs are sufficiently heterogeneous and initial 
pollution stocks were sufficiently small with a dynamic game model [29]. This is due to a shadow 
price applied by the central authority to pollution, whereas local authorities use different shadow 
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prices, and, therefore, different standards in a second-best world. Segerson and Wu developed a simple 
game-theoretical model to analyze the use of a policy that combined a voluntary approach to 
controlling nonpoint-source pollution with a background threat of an ambient tax (or losing 
government subsidies) if the voluntary approach was unsuccessful in meeting the pre-specified 
environmental goal [30]. Lu analyzed the strategic choice of interaction between sewage companies 
and environmental protection authorities with an evolutionary game theory method [31]. Yang et al. 
argued potential policy alternatives could be generated for water resource management and pollution 
control with game mode [32]. Zou and Hu established the game model of the government’s 
environmental regulation and company’s pollution treatment with the game theory [33]. As the 
foundation of institutions, all the games of resource allocation should be sorted out once the political 
rules were confirmed [34]. System is a balance of potential social game [28]. Irene et al. proposed 
Game theory as a decision making tool was adapted to analyze the various inter-plant water integration 
schemes in an in an eco-industrial park [35]. Jørgensen et al. proposed the dynamic state-space games 
to formulate and analyze intertemporal decision-making problems in the economics and management 
of pollution [36]. Wang et al. introduced influential factors of company decisions into the evolutionary 
game model [37]. Shen argued that Government and company behavior were based on limited rational 
dynamic repeated game in the process of environmental protection [38]. Yuan and Geng revealed that 
environmental policies were the most important factor affecting the development of environmental 
industry with game theory [39]. Hu and Wang suggested that enterprises should invest in and finance 
the environmental protection industry in order to achieve the long-term benefits [40]. In summary, the 
institutional evolutionary game theory provides an effective approach to investigate the environmental 
issues. In practice, there are many factors, other than the type of pollutants and emission scales, that 
the government needs to consider when formulating the sewage charge system or tax subsidy. This 
includes the degree of impacts of same pollution charges standard and tax subsidies on different types 
of industry in terms of environmental management and pollution production decisions. Therefore, the 
development of the environmental protection industry is subject to the above factors, and their 
relations have shown a nonlinear dynamic process. Therefore, a novel game model of incremental 
sewage charges system among government, polluting enterprises, and the environmental protection 
industry is proposed in this study. The findings provide a useful reference for the process of 
formulating and evaluating environmental policies, particularly sewage charges policies. 
2. Mechanism Analysis 
There are negative externalities of environmental pollution and the publicity of environmental resources. 
Therefore, government should consider the social welfare as a system and improve environmental 
quality continuously by means of formulating appropriate environmental policies. The social welfare 
including the entire country, polluting enterprises, environmental protection industry, as well as the 
public, should be taken into consideration. As the country represents the public interests, its ultimate 
goal is to achieve the maximization of social welfare. Social welfare mainly consists of the profit of 
polluting enterprises and environmental protection industry, consumer surplus, environmental damage, 
and sewage charges. Among these, the profit of polluting enterprises and environmental protection 
industry is influenced by their own business strategies. The larger the profit the greater social welfare 
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will be generated. Environmental damage is mainly caused by discharged pollutants from polluting 
enterprises. There is a correlation between pollutant emissions and production volume. Therefore, the 
degree of environmental damage is finally determined by the strategy of production and pollution 
control of polluting enterprises. Environmental damage has negative externality, which will reduce 
social welfare. In order to control environmental pollution, the government should collect fees for 
discharged pollutants, which belongs to social welfare. The sewage charges will be dedicated to 
improving environmental quality, such as investing in environmental protection initiatives. 
The aim of polluting enterprises in the game model is to maximize their own interests, i.e., achieving 
optimal profit under the context of environmental policies by means of enacting the production 
strategy and emission disposal strategy. The main factors affecting polluting enterprises’ profit 
include: price and cost of its own products, its pollution treatment strategy, price of environmental 
protection industry’s product, and the government’s sewage charges. Product of polluting enterprises, 
directly aimed at consumers, associated with a demand curve in which production volume decreases 
along with a price cut. In general, if the technological innovation is not achieved in the short term, the 
unit cost of production remains unchanged. Additionally, the emission disposal strategy of polluting 
enterprises also has a great influence on its profit. Environmental protection industry and polluting 
enterprises are crucial parts of the industry chain. The environmental protection industry provides 
products or services for polluting enterprises. Therefore, the interests of the environmental protection 
industry are largely influenced by the production strategy of polluting enterprises. The environmental 
protection industry also pursuits the maximal profit. As environmental protection has positive effects, 
the realization of the interests of the environmental protection industry needs the support of 
environmental policies. The major factors influencing the profits of environmental protection 
enterprises include market demand potential, the government’s sewage charges, and polluting 
enterprises’ production strategies. Polluting enterprises and the environmental protection industry 
pursue the maximum individual interest in the game process. The pollution control cost of 
environmental protection enterprises generally increases with the amount of discharged pollutants. 
Therefore, polluting enterprises will a choose pollutant disposal strategy when the sewage charges are 
greater than the pollution control costs charged by environmental protection firms, or vice versa. 
Therefore, the government can achieve the maximization of social welfare through formulating and 
collecting fees for discharging pollutants. Sewage charges influence the production and pollution 
treatment strategy of polluting enterprises indirectly. The environmental protection industry will adjust 
their production strategy according to the pollution treatment strategy of polluting enterprises in order 
to ensure the maximization of their own profits [15]. The mechanism of the government’s 
environmental policies affecting polluting enterprises and environment protection enterprises is 
described in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Mechanism analysis of environmental protection system affecting polluting 
enterprises and environmental protection industry. 
 
3. Methods 
The purpose of sewage charge is a common approach over the world to prevent and control 
environmental pollution, which in turn helps to improve the environmental quality. Normally, sewage 
charge is higher with the higher requirements of environmental governance. As a result, sewage charge 
showed an ascending trend. In general, there are two ways for defining the sewage charge standard. 
The first approach is a linear increasing according to the pollutant scale. The second approach is the 
incremental nonlinear increasing in accordance with the amount of pollutants discharged. The sewage 
charge standard, defined by the second approach, is generally greater than that of the first approach, 
therefore, it has drawn a higher degree of attention from the industry. 
This paper introduces a game model with an incremental mode of sewage charges with an aim  
to analyze the game behavior among the government, polluting enterprises, and environment protection 
enterprises. The game behavior is among the government, polluting enterprises, and environment 
protection enterprises, analyzed with the incremental mode of sewage charges by introducing game 
model. The parameters of the proposed game model are:  
 Game participants have completed reciprocal information and acted at the same time. It 
belongs to the complete information static game. 
 Game participants are fully rational. The goal of the government is to realize the maximum 
overall social welfare. Polluting enterprises and the environmental protection industry pursues 
the maximum profit. The environmental policies of the government are mainly formulating 
standards for sewage charges. Variables of polluting enterprises’ decision-making are mainly 
production Q1 and the amount of pollution emissions u. A variable of environmental protection 
firm’s decision-making is the production volume of environment protection product Q2. 
32121 LTSSLLW   (1)
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The overall social welfare is described as Equation (1). In which, the profit of polluting enterprises 
is L1, the profit of the environmental protection industry is L2, the environmental damage of pollution 
is L3, the income of the government’s collection of sewage charges is T, the consumer surplus of 
polluting enterprises is S1, and the consumer surplus of the environment protection industry is S2 [11]. 
The function for market demand of products from polluting enterprises is calculated as Equation (2). 
1 1 1 1P a b Q   (2)
where P1 is the price of product. It is assumed that the amount of products from polluting enterprises 
increases according to the increase of discharged pollutants. There is a linear relationship between u 
and Q1. 
1kQu   (3)
Assume that the incremental charge mode of sewage charge is adopted instead of the same fee per 
unit of pollutants (i.e., linear approach). Namely, the total sewage charges T is an increasing nonlinear 
function of the pollutants (u) discharged from polluting enterprises. 
tutuT  2  (4)
Each unit of pollutants emission is charged at a rate of t. It is charged at a rate of tu2 for every 
increase of quantity of u2. 
The damage of environmental pollution is determined by the types of pollutants and the conditions 
of polluted environment. Environmental damage is unified with monetary unit of measurement, which 
is shown in Equation (5), 
3 0γL u L   (5)
where L3 represents environmental pollution loss, L0 represents the assimilative capacity of environmental 
pollution. When the pollutants are in the range of 0-L0, the environment can perform natural purification 
without producing pollution damage. 
During the pricing process of environmental protection industry, sewage charges and the demands 
of the polluting enterprises are the main influencing factors. It is supposed that the marginal cost MC 
of environmental protection enterprises is composed of basic unit management cost C0 and pollution 
control cost C1. C0 is the sunk cost such as the plants and equipment as the initial investment from 
environmental protection industry. The more pollutants produced, the greater the marginal cost for 
management. It is assumed that there is a positive linear relationship between the management cost and 
pollutant quantity u, as shown in Equation (6). 
0 1 0 1αMC C C C kQ     (6)
where α represents the cost of disposing per unit of pollutants. It is assumed that polluting enterprises 
produce kQ1 pollutants, associated with Q1 amount of products. When the product price of the 
environmental protection firm is P2, the condition for profit maximization of the environmental 
protection industry is shown as Equation (7). 
2P MR MC  (7)
2 0 1αP C kQ   (8)
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It is assumed that there is a linear relationship between product quantity of environmental protection 
industry and the quantity of pollutants. 
2 βQ u  (9)
where β represents the quantity of environmental products that are required to dispose a unit of pollutants. 
According to Equations (3) and (4), sewage charges for final unit of pollutants collected by the 
government is, 
2
1 1T / 2M dT dQ tk Q tk    (10)
As the marginal cost of environmental protection cost is 0 1MC C kQ  , when MT MC , 







   (11)
where Q1* represents the critical production of polluting enterprises. 
Polluting enterprises will make choices of game strategy according to the following different conditions:  
 The initial pollution treatment cost of the environmental protection industry as C0. When 0C tk , 





result is shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 2. Government marginal sewage charges with environmental protection enterprises 
marginal treatment costs on condition of 2α 2k tk . 
 
The initial pollution control cost of the environmental protection industry 1 1αC kQ  is increasing, 
due to the sewage charges by the government. Therefore, when the marginal pollution treatment cost 
of the environmental protection industry is larger than the marginal sewage charges (t), namely 
MC MT , polluting enterprises will choose to pay sewage charges. 
 The initial pollution treatment cost of the environmental protection industry as C0. When C0 > tK, 




  . The 
result is shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Government marginal sewage charges with environmental protection enterprises 
marginal treatment costs on the condition of 2α 2k tk . 
 
Q1* is the equilibrium quantity. The production volume of polluting enterprises as Q1. When 
1 1 *Q Q , the discharge fees for the part excessive to the equilibrium quantity are substantially high. 
Polluting enterprises will choose to engage environmental protection firm to treat pollutants. When 
*
1 1Q Q , polluting enterprises will choose to pay sewage charges. 





 , the result is 
shown in Figure 4. 
When 1 1 *Q Q , the discharge fees for the part excessive to the equilibrium quantity are 
substantially high, polluting enterprises will choose to pay sewage charges. When 1 1 *Q Q , polluting 
enterprises will choose to engage environmental protection industry to treat pollutants. 




result is shown in Figure 5. 
Figure 4. Government marginal sewage charges with environmental protection industry 




  . 
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Figure 5. Government marginal sewage charges with environmental protection industry 






Sewage charges increases relatively faster than that of the disposal cost. Therefore, polluting 
enterprises will determine the production volume according to market demands and meanwhile engage 
environmental protection industry to treat pollutants. 
Equation (12) shows the profit analysis of environmental protection industry at the balanced production. 
2 2 0 2 1 2( ) αL P C Q kQ Q    (12)
According to Equation (11) and 2 1 = βQ KQ , when the profit of an environmental protection firm is 
maximized, it can be expressed as:  
2
2 2 20 0
2 1 2 2 1
αβ( )α αβ ; αβ ( )
(2 α) 2 α*
C tK C tKL kQ Q k Q K
tk K tK
       (13)
Equation (13) is the function of the impacts of governmental sewage charges on the environmental 
protection industry’s profits. It is a direct manifestation of how the environmental policies affect the 
development of environmental protection industry. Among these factors, α, β, k, and C0 are market 
environmental parameters that cannot be adjusted and changed manually in short term. Therefore, 
environmental policy is the only factor influencing the development of the environmental protection 
industry. With the production strategy of the environmental protection industry and the pollution control 
strategy of polluting enterprises play little role in developing the environmental protection industry. 
The profit function of environmental protection industry achieves the maximum value when 
2 / 0dL dt  . There is a direct relationship between the profit maximization of the environmental 
protection industry and t, C0 and k. Therefore, in order to elevate the firm’s profit, the government’s 
sewage charges t should be taken into consideration. In addition, the technical level of the 
environmental protection industry is another relevant factor. 
According to Figures 2–5, the strategy choice of polluting enterprises either to control pollutants or 





Figure 2 shows that when t determined by the government is relatively smaller, the constraint effect 
on polluting enterprises is smaller. Then, polluting enterprises will still choose to discharge pollutants. 
Although the sewage charges are collected, there have been damage to the environmental quality. 
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Figure 3 shows that even if the government determined lower sewage charges t, polluting enterprises 
will still be encouraged to choose environmental protection related services and products. This can be 
achieved if environmental protection industry can effectively reduce the cost of pollution treatment 
(i.e., the marginal cost curve is relatively alleviated) through technological innovation (with government 
tax subsidies or other supporting policies). 
As shown in Figure 4, the polluting enterprises will choose pollution management strategy in the 
first instance with the condition of higher sewage charges t. When the production volume excesses the 
equilibrium quantity, sewage charges will be paid for the exceeded part. 
Figure 5 revealed if the government formulated higher sewage charges t, and the cost of the 
environmental protection industry is relatively lower, the enterprise will completely choose to dispose 
pollution instead of paying discharge fees. This shows that the government measures are to make it 
compulsory for polluting enterprises to adopt the environmental protection strategy. 
In short, a game model is introduced in this paper among government, polluting enterprises  
and environmental protection industry with incremental mode of sewage charges in order to analyze 
the game behavior of government, polluting enterprises and environment protection industry under  
four different scenarios. Analysis revealed that the polluting enterprises’ strategy towards pollution 
treatment is affected directly by the level of sewage charges. The pollution enterprises are more likely 
to pay sewage charges rather than pollution treatment, unless a higher sewage charge policy in place 
together with a reduction of the treatment cost of environmental protection industry. These findings 
provide a useful reference for enacting environmental policy and environmental protection industry 
development plan. 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1. Data Collection 
In China, sewage charges are determined by local governments according to local conditions. The 
sewage charges collection is the responsibility of local environmental protection authorities. The 
formulation of sewage charges varies from region to region according to the different levels of local 
economic development and environmental pollution in China. 
The Chinese authorities have provided the official statistics of the environmental protection industry 
in 2004. However, such official statistics have not been compiled nationwide since then. Therefore, 
these data related to environmental protection industry need to be, first, sorted. The income of the 
regional environmental protection industry is obtained from China’s environmental protection industry 
research report [41], China Statistical Yearbook [42], and Li et al. [43]. Investment on environmental 
pollution control is obtained from the China Environment Statistical Yearbook [44]. The revenue of 
sewage charges and number of organizations paying sewage charges are obtained from the official 
website of the Bureau of Statistics of China [45]. The profits of the environmental protection industry  
are arrived by means of income of regional environmental protection industry minus investment on 
environmental pollution control. These statistics are shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Statistics of environmental protection industry and sewage charges in different 



















Beijing 426.3 2.31 1921 35.75 LDR 
Tianjin 276.73 1.10 3984 180.42 LDR 
Hebei 632.22 3.71 27973 1372.48 HR 
Shanxi 266.82 2.07 10446 1662.99 HR 
Inner 
Mongolia 
1200 2.39 6017 1029.34 LUR 
Liaoning 1000 2.07 27568 1206.30 HR 
Jilin 120 1.24 24187 418.77 LDR 
Heilongjiang 259.22 1.31 10984 438.83 LDR 
Shanghai 961.29 1.34 5455 248.28 LDR 
Jiangsu 3410 4.66 34566 2026.12 HR 
Zhejiang 2557.5 3.34 30536 1014.73 LDR 
Anhui 357.3 1.80 14404 528.56 LUR 
Fujian 400 1.30 20006 352.45 LDR 
Jiangxi 236.28 1.57 7521 478.07 LUR 
Shandong 1278.8 4.84 17685 1506.86 HR 
Henan 600 1.32 16489 917.91 LUR 
Hubei 600 1.47 9969 375.42 LDR 
Hunan 643 1.07 12433 542.61 LUR 
Guangdong 1700 14.16 62578 941.38 LDR 
Guangxi 95 1.64 8833 466.73 LUR 
Hainan 59.87 0.24 919 36.05 LUR 
Chongqing 245.69 1.76 6928 377.26 LUR 
Sichuan 270 0.89 7602 585.67 LUR 
Guizhou 50 0.30 7595 453.04 LUR 
Yunnan 72.24 1.06 7395 292.14 LUR 
Tibet 5.075 0.003 4688 8.82 LUR 
Shanxi 327.7 1.79 5177 478.93 LDR 
Gansu 41.21 0.64 8489 213.07 LUR 
Qinghai 13.50 0.17 1241 66.24 LUR 
Ningxia 16.90 0.35 2897 146.90 LUR 
Xinjiang 54.37 0.78 7089 416.88 LUR 
Notes: HR stands for higher sewage charges region; LDR stands for lower sewage charges and developed 
region; LUR stands for lower sewage charges and undeveloped region. 
4.2. Results and Discussion 
STATA is a useful software tool for data analysis and database management which has been widely 
adopted in environmental protection related studies [46–48]. STATA software was employed to 
undertake statistical analysis of the data shown in Table1. t value was 4.9 and 4.43, respectively, and 
the coefficient was significant under 1% of significance level. F value was 18.40. This indicated that 
the equation was highly significant at the condition of p = 0.0000. R2 was 83%, which indicated that 
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the model could explain 83% of the data with a high goodness of fit. The scatter plot of the STATA 
statistical results is shown in Figure 6. All the variables passed the test, which suggests that the 
explanatory variables are reasonable and in consistence with the actual situation. The game model 
result of provincial environmental protection industry in China is described as Equation (14), 
3 2
2 = 1.62 28.35





where L2 and t represent the profit of environmental protection industry and sewage charges, respectively. 
Figure 6. The scatter plot of environmental protection industry and sewage charges in 
different regions of China in 2010.  
 
The result of the regression model accords with practical significance that the model represents, i.e., 
there exists nonlinear relationship between the profits of the environmental protection industry and 
government’s sewage charges. This is basically in line with the conclusions of Equation (13). 
Although Equation (14) is obtained via static game model analysis, it can still reflect the formulation 
of environmental policies and the development of the environmental protection industry. It can be 
further explored whether the environmental policy made by government can play an effective role in 
the game between environmental protection industry and polluting enterprises. 
As shown in Table 1, the regional development of environmental protection industry in China is 
extremely uneven. The environmental protection industry in eastern regions is much more developed 
than that in other regions by virtue of the economic strength and ability of investment. By contrast, the 
central and western regions saw slower development of the environmental protection industry due to 
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comparatively weaker economic status. The income of environmental protection industry accounts 
more than 58% of the national outputs nation in eastern regions with most contributions from Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang, Shandong, Guangdong, Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, and other provinces and cities. The total 
income of the environmental protection industry in western regions (including Guangxi, Sichuan, 
Guizhou, Yunnan, Gansu, Qinghai, Xinjiang, Ningxia) is less than 20% of that in Jiangsu. 
A further analysis of Equation (14) shows, when t is equal to 1.167 billion RMB, the profits of  
the environmental protection industry will reach the maximum, and the overall social welfare during 
the game equilibrium will be achieved. When the sewage charge t ˃ 1.167 billion RMB, the income  
of the environmental protection industry will decrease due to the increase of sewage charges. Local 
governments need to lower the sewage charge standards to improve social welfare, encourage the 
technical updating of environmental protection industry, and reduce the pollution control cost of 
enterprises. When the sewage charge t ˂ 1.167 billion RMB, the profit of the environmental protection 
industry will increase due to the increase of sewage charges. Local governments need to raise the 
sewage charge standards, push the polluting enterprises to take measures for pollution control and 
promote the further development of the environmental protection industry [11]. 
Table 1 shows that sewage charges in Hebei, Shanxi, Liaoning, Jiangsu, and Shandong are higher 
than 1.167 billion RMB. The profits of the environmental protection industries in these regions decrease 
with the increases of sewage charges. However, it also shows that there are more stringent 
requirements of environmental control in these regions. Especially in Jiangsu Province, the output 
value of the environmental protection industry ranked first across the nation, accounting for 8.2% of 
local GDP. These local governments need to lower the sewage charge standards. The environmental 
protection industry must improve the level of scientific and technological innovation so that cost is 
reduced. There are still large potentials for the environmental protection industry in these regions. 
Sewage charge of any of other 25 regions is less than 1.167 billion RMB. This indicates that  
a lower overall intensity of collecting fees which did not reach the optimal level of environmental 
quality and social welfare in China. It also indicated the overall scale of China's environmental 
protection industry is relatively small despite a rapid growth. It generally falls far behind that of 
Europe and the United States [41]. The average sewage charges paid by the polluting enterprises  
in Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Hainan, Yunnan, Gansu, Tibet, Qinghai and Ningxia are far less than 
1.167 billion RMB. However, the profits of the environmental protection industries in these regions 
varied significantly. For instance, the profit of the environmental protection industry in Shanghai is  
189.3 times of that of Tibet, albeit only 28.2 times more in terms of sewage discharge. This is mainly 
due to the local economic development approach and the sewage charges policy formulated by the local 
government. Figures 2 and 3 shows that the polluting enterprises are not proactive to dispose pollution 
as the government’s sewage charges are relatively lower. This situation will lead to inevitable damage 
to the natural environment. Therefore, in order to achieve improvement of environmental quality and 
social welfare, within the game between government and polluting enterprises, the first step is to 
increase the sewage charges. 
The above analysis revealed that sewage charges of local governments varied significantly in 
different regions of China. The method of sewage charges is not applied as an effective leverage  
to regulate the behavior of polluting enterprises. The following recommendations are proposed to 
improve the current practice and situation. 
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(1) During the development of sewage charges, the local government should place more focus on 
the social welfare of the entire society rather than simply aiming for taxation revenue for sake 
of environmental protection. It is imperative to consider the coping measures of polluting 
enterprises as a game player, and to achieve the purpose of environment management through 
developing environmental protection industry as much as possible. 
The intensity of discharge levy would directly affect the local environmental quality and social 
welfare to a great extent. As a result, governments of different regions need to formulate a reasonable 
standard of sewage charges, according to different types of pollutants discharged and economic 
development patterns. Incremental type of sewage charges standard is more effective than linear mode. 
(2) It is proposed that different standards are adopted in different regions in order to maintain its 
effectiveness. The whole country can be divided into three kinds of regions, i.e., regions with 
higher sewage charges, regions with lower sewage charges and underdeveloped economy, and 
regions with lower sewage charges and developed economy. The higher sewage charges 
regions are Hebei, Shanxi, Liaoning, Jiangsu, and Shandong. Lower sewage charges and 
undeveloped regions are Inner Mongolia, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hunan, Guangxi, Hainan, 
Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang. Lower 
sewage charges and developed regions are Beijing, Tianjin, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Shanghai, 
Zhejiang, Fujian, Hubei, Guangdong, and Shanxi (see Table 1). In regions with higher sewage 
charges, it is necessary to reduce the original sewage charge standards. However for Shanxi,  
a province with rich coal resources in China, its economic development mainly relies on  
coal mining and processing. The excessive reliance on coal resources has resulted in an 
unreasonable economic structure and serious environmental degradation. Accordingly, Shanxi 
has increased the level of sewage charges for several times. For instance, the “Notice on 
implementation of the action plan for the prevention and control of atmospheric pollution in 
Shanxi Province” was issued in 2013, which specified that the level of sewage charges will be 
further increased and the scope will be extended [49]. For regions with lower sewage charges 
and underdeveloped regions, such as Tibet, Xinjiang and Qinghai, considering the local 
economy condition, environmental damage caused by the economic development is limited 
which has yet to affect the quality of life of local residents. Therefore, it is recommended to 
maintain the current sewage charge standards in a short-term basis. When the local economy 
conditions develop to a higher level, to the authorities should consider increase sewage charges 
standard appropriately. For regions with lower sewage charges and developed economy 
condition (such as Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, Guangdong, Jilin), it is proposed to increase 
sewage charges and strengthen the supervision on the implementation of environment 
protection policy at the central government level. For instance, as the capital city, Beijing has 
made a great deal of effort on pollution treatment, as well as improving the air quality. In 2014, 
the level of sewage charges for SO2, NOx and other pollutants increased by 14 to 15 times of 
the original level and has become the highest level in the 31 regions [50]. It was reported that 
the leverage function is strengthened since the implementation of the new collection standards. 
(3) At present, China’s environmental issues are not only related to the enforcement of environmental 
law and supervision of local governments, but also relevant to the relatively lower level of 
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science and technology of the environmental protection industry in China. The environmental 
management cost is higher associated with comparatively lower technical level of the industry. 
Illegal discharging of pollutants is not unusual as some polluting enterprises tried to escape 
from the substantial cost of environmental treatment. Therefore, it is imperative to enhance  
the technological level of environmental protection industry. Technological innovation can 
reduce the environmental management cost and improve the profits of the environmental 
protection industry, as well as sustaining competitiveness against international environmental 
protection industry. 
5. Conclusions 
This study developed a novel game model based on incremental mode to analyze the mechanism of 
dynamic interactions between environmental policies, environmental protection industry, and polluting 
enterprises. The influence of polluting enterprises on pollution treatment strategy and the development 
of environmental protection industry, with high or low sewage charges standards of four kinds of 
modes are analyzed. It is concluded that the pollution treatment strategy of polluting enterprises 
depends on the government's sewage charges to a large extent. Policy pressure of higher sewage charge 
and reduced treatment cost of the environmental protection industry help to promote the development of 
the environmental protection industry. 
This research provides useful implications for environmental policies. It is revealed in this study 
that the polluting enterprises’ strategy towards pollution treatment is affected directly by the level of 
sewage charges. First of all, the current collection method of sewage charges needs to be improved. 
The incremental mode of sewage charges is proposed to address the deficiency associated with the 
current collection method. Secondly, the sewage charges levy level should be increased gradually 
based on the economic development conditions of different regions. On the other hand, the level of 
sewage charges should not be increased without a limit, otherwise, the overall social welfare will not 
reach an optimal level. Thirdly, the scope of the sewage charges should be extended according to the 
environmental management requirements. This measure has been implemented in some regions. For 
instance, volatile organic sewage has been levied in China since 2013 in order to improve 
environmental quality. Some provinces, such as Jiangsu, Guangdong, and Jilin have recently issued 
legislations for sewage charges of dust emissions from building construction sites. 
The STATA software was employed in this study to carry out a statistical analysis of the development 
status of environmental protection industry of 31 regions in China, in 2010. The results indicate that 
the overall intensity of discharge penalty is low in China, and sewage charges are not applied as an 
effective leverage to regulate the behavior of polluting enterprises. In view of the actual development 
of the environmental protection industry in China, it is proposed that different regions (i.e., higher 
sewage charges region, lower sewage charges and undeveloped region, lower sewage charges and 
developed region) adopt different collecting standards so that the environmental policy is more 
purposively. For regions with higher sewage charges, it will be more useful to decrease the sewage 
charge standards. For regions with lower sewage charges and underdeveloped economy can maintain 
the original standard of sewage charges considering their level of economy and environment status. 
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For regions with lower sewage charges and developed economy condition, sewage charges need to  
be increased. 
There are other factors that affect the development of the environmental protection industry such as 
the technology, institutional and policy implementation, etc. The technological level is undoubtedly 
one of crucial factors to be considered when planning and developing the environmental protection 
industry. It can not only improve the profit level of the industry, but also improve the effectiveness of 
environmental treatment. In addition, environmental policies, legislations and regulations also play a 
critical role in promoting the development of environmental protection industry. For instance, the 
“Action plan for prevention and control of atmospheric pollution”. issued in 2013, has created a 
number of opportunities for the environmental protection industry. such as desulfurization and 
denitrification. Future research opportunities exist to investigate the impacts of these factors on the 
environmental protection industry. 
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